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Abstract:
In theories of interpretation, the artwork’s “surface” is frequently cast as something
to be looked past in our quest for meaning. As such, the “surface” has also
understandably been the focus of several polemics against the excesses of
interpretive criticism – in film scholarship and beyond. This article explores what
role concepts of the “surface” and “surface meaning” might fruitfully play in the
interpretation of fiction films by thinking about a particular kind of expression-by-
implication available to the medium: irony. An under-theorised phenomenon,
filmic irony could seem to require interpretation in order to grasp meanings that
reside precisely elsewhere than the “surface”. Yet, can we even distinguish between
a “surface meaning” and an “implied” meaning in a non-linguistic medium like
film? This article addresses such questions by exploring the possibility of separating
the explicit and implicit, as well as interpretation and comprehension, in a medium
whose very capacity for ironic expression has sometimes been doubted.
Keywords: film; irony; interpretation; surface; meaning; implication; aesthetics;
Clueless; Amy Heckerling; V. F. Perkins; David Bordwell
One place we often encounter the notion of the artwork’s “surface” is in
theories of interpretation. Frequently, it is cast as something to be
looked past in our quest for meanings that are assumed to remain
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“unrealised in the surface of the text” (Jameson, 1983, p. 48) or
“not displayed by the textual surface” (Eco, 1992, p. 64). Unsurprisingly,
then, the concept of the “surface” also recurs in several polemics against
the interpretive hunt for buried meanings. From Sontag’s (1966) infamous
rallying cry to salvos like Best and Marcus’s (2009) “Surface Reading”,
pleas for critics and scholars to abandon or rethink interpretation as a
practice are often accompanied by recommendations that we “reveal the
sensuous surface of art without mucking about in it” (Sontag, 1966,
p. 13), or “attend to the surfaces of texts rather than plumb their depths”
(Best & Marcus, 2009, pp. 1–2). Within film studies too, calls from
various quarters have periodically used similar vocabularies – from the
Deleuzian “haptic” criticism of Laura Marks, which “move[s] along the
surface of the object, rather than attempting to […] ‘interpret ’ it” (2002,
p.xiii); to Adrian Martin’s and Cristina A´lvarez Lo´pez’s appeal for a critical
focus on “the cinematic surface” that might dissuade us from the
temptation “of interpreting [films], of asking what they mean” (2013,
p. 1). Perhaps the most sustained and famous critique of interpretation
in film studies is David Bordwell’s Making Meaning, and it similarly
proposes that “what may matter as much as [interpreting] implicit or
symptomatic meanings is the surface of the work” (1989, p. 264). This
article explores what role this concept, “the surface of the work”, might
fruitfully play precisely in the interpretation of fiction films; it does
so by thinking about a particular kind of expression available to the
medium: irony.
Having long been theorised by literary theorists, philosophers, linguists,
rhetoricians and psychologists, it is startling to realise that, while film
scholars regularly employ the term “irony”, in our discipline it seems
“almost never [to be] theoretically scrutinised” (Ellestro¨m, 2002,
p. 146).1 This is unfortunate, not least because to think seriously about
irony in any artform is immediately to be confronted by many key
questions facing aesthetics and poetics – from the proper role of intention
in interpretation, to the theoretical possibility of mis-interpretation,
to a medium’s very means of expression. Having begun to address
such issues elsewhere (MacDowell, 2016), I will here try to approach the
final one from a fresh perspective: via the question of “surface meaning”
in film.
1. Notable exceptions include Doane (1979), Sconce (2002), Allen (2007), and Currie
(2010, pp. 148–185). I also engage throughout with MacDowell (2016) and numerous
(often brief) theoretical accounts of irony by other film scholars.
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Surfaces, Irony and Meanings in Film
I should begin by saying that I take the methodological appeal of
“attend[ing] to the surfaces of texts” as a given. If an artwork’s “surface”
is in large part its form or style, then insisting upon the fundamental
importance of “surfaces” to our accounts of artworks is plainly a
necessity. Certainly, at least, consideration of the “surface” cannot be
divorced from a consideration of meaning. Whatever “meanings” we take
an aesthetic object to be expressing simply cannot come into being except
via that object’s “form”. Despite this proposition having been nominally
accepted in innumerable guises since at least the days of New Criticism,
the methodological responsibility it logically confers is still too readily
shirked – not least in film scholarship. So, if to demand attention to a
film’s “surface” is merely to restate our commitment to attending to the
multifarious contributions “form” makes to every aspect of “content”,
then this project assuredly deserves a permanent place in our interpretive
procedures.
Yet it is precisely the validity of interpretive procedures that is so often
questioned by those who urge us to linger upon art’s “surface”. How,
then, might wholesale arguments against interpretation hope to deal with
a phenomenon like irony, which has been aptly called the “mode of the
unsaid, the unheard, the unseen” (Hutcheon, 1994, p. 9)? At least when it
comes to the types of irony used in communication or artistic expression,2
irony is very frequently defined in terms of opposing a “surface meaning”
to an implied meaning. For instance, what is usually called “verbal”,
sometimes “communicative” (see Currie, 2011), irony – for example,
sarcasm – will usually be “intended to be reconstructed with meanings
different from those on the surface” (Booth, 1974, p. 6). Equally,
“dramatic” irony in storytelling involves engineering “a strong contrast,
unperceived by a character in a story, between the surface meaning of
[their] words or deeds and something else happening in the same story”
(Dempster, 1932, p. 7). The technique we often term “structural” irony,
too, typically “provokes questions about the surface appearance of the
whole work” (Auger, 2010, p. 282). Given, then, that these forms of
expression appear to rely upon implying contrasts with meanings assumed
to reside on the “surface”, accounting for irony in film could seem,
in some fundamental sense, to require interpretation.
2. That is to say: excluding such types as “situational ” irony, as well as philosophical
approaches to “Romantic ” irony that regard it as “something like a human condition or
predicament” (Colebrook, 2004, p. 47).
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We might use irony to consider the interpretive significance of the
“surface” or “surface meaning” in relation to any artform. The other
question I want to address is more particular to film: what can even be said
to constitute a “surface meaning” in this medium? Confronting this issue is
necessary partly because of the longstanding assumption that “irony is, after
all, primarily a linguistic concept” (Bribitzer-Stull, 2004, p. 132). Scholars
of irony in numerous disciplines routinely treat the site of ironic expression
as if it were always a “statement”, “utterance”, or some other discrete unit
of language. This in turn can encourage a taxonomical drift from “surface
meanings” to “ literal meanings” – sometimes via flat conflations of the
two as, for example, “surface or literal meaning” (Stringfellow, 1994, p. 5),
or even “surface-literal meaning” (Giora, 1997, p. 239). It seems reasonable
in principle to attribute literal meanings to written statements or verbal
utterances.3 What, though, could plausibly serve a comparable function
to “surface-literal meaning” in a non-linguistic, audiovisual medium
like the live-action fiction film? A complementary problem also attends
the nature of “ ironic meaning” in films. In linguistic texts, ironic meanings
may be called “non-literal” (Booth, 1974, p. 40) or “transliteral” (Muecke,
1970, p. 100); but to what equivalent category might an implied, ironic
meaning belong in a medium whose relationship to the concept of “literal
meaning” itself seems far less clear?
Given this potentially troublesome fit between the fiction film and
widespread theoretical approaches to irony, it is perhaps unsurprising that
some have argued this medium might in fact have only a “limited palette”
for ironic expression (Currie, 2010, p. 169), or even that “the weapon of
irony [is] unavailable to the visual storyteller” (Kroeber, 2006, p. 59).
I believe that filmic irony is nowhere near so rare or challenging as this
(MacDowell, 2016, p. 21–88). However, explaining why requires us to
think through what is involved in interpreting this medium’s “surface”.
Interpreting Meanings in Film
I have intimated that abandoning interpretation entirely in favour of
“surface reading” (Best & Marcus, 2009) could threaten to leave us
ill-equipped to deal with ironic expression in general. However, in
practice not all arguments against interpretation are so unpromising
in this regard as they might appear. Best and Marcus, for instance,
largely reserve their scepticism specifically for “symptomatic reading”,
3. Notwithstanding certain theorists’ sceptical questions about the linguistic concept of
“ literal meaning” (e.g. Fish, 1989), which have received – to my mind – convincing
answers from Wilson (1992), among others.
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which “argues that the most interesting aspect of a text is what it
represses” (Best & Marcus, 2009, p. 3). The relatively precise scope of this
critique is significant. “Symptomatic” interpretation does indeed tend to
focus on meanings regarded as “repressed”, or only unconsciously
present – rather than, that is, those regarded as intentionally implied. As
such, a symptomatic reading may well attribute “unconscious” ironies
to artworks.4 However, it will tend to be less concerned with ironic
expression per se, whose very definition as a mode of address seems
to presuppose someone or something “consciously and intentionally
employing a technique” (Muecke, 1969, p. 42) – whether that be a
flesh-and-blood author (Muecke, 1970), an implied author (Booth, 1974),
the text itself (Eco, 1992), or otherwise.5 By contrast, an approach
to “surface reading” that remains theoretically open to interpreting what
a work’s “surface” may purposely imply seems eminently capable of
accounting for irony.
Bordwell’s influential critique of interpretation in film, however, goes
much further. Interpretations, he argues, may indeed be “symptomatic”,
in which case they claim to uncover “repressed […] meanings that the
work divulges ‘ involuntarily ’” (1989, p. 9). Yet they may also be
“explicatory”, in which case they seek to discern, among other things,
“ implicit meanings” that “the film is […] assumed to ‘speak indirectly ’”
(Bordwell, 1989, p. 8). It is thus in opposition to both symptomatic and
explicative interpretation that Bordwell positions his recommendation
that we attend instead to “the surface of the work” (1989, p. 264). Since
this approach to “surface reading” appears insulated from not only
symptomatic but also implied meaning, Bordwell’s attention to the
“surface” would appear to foreclose the very possibility of acknowledging
a phenomenon like ironic expression, which fundamentally relies upon
implication. This need not necessarily be a problem – if, for instance,
Bordwell were to encourage abandoning or radically decentering the
whole activity of understanding films’ meanings, perhaps recommending
instead something like Sontag’s (1966) “erotics of art” or Marks’s
(2002) “haptic” criticism. Yet this is not the case. Instead, Bordwell
crucially attempts to distinguish interpreting films from another, more
intellectually justifiable, way of understanding their meanings:
“comprehending” them. When comprehending films, Bordwell argues,
4. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that deconstruction, for example, seeks to demonstrate
that “all meaning is potentially ironic” (Colebrook, 2004: 105).
5. For an exploration of why interpreting irony seems to require commitment to some
form of intentionalism, see MacDowell (2016, pp. 155–207).
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we are concerned with two types of meaning: (1) “referential meanings”,
which relate to the nature of a film’s fictional world, characters, and story
(1989, p. 8); and (2) a film’s “explicit meaning”, which he regards as a
“conceptual meaning or ‘point ’ [that] a film is assumed to ‘speak
directly ’” – via, for instance, “a verbal indication such as the line ‘There’s
no place like home’ at the end of The Wizard of Oz” (1989, p. 8). Taken
together, Bordwell suggests, “referential and explicit meaning make up
what are usually considered ‘ literal ’ meanings” (1989, p. 8).
Before we can wrestle with what this notion of “literal meaning” might
mean in film, it is necessary to place some pressure on Bordwell’s dis-
tinction between “interpretation” and “comprehension”. To differentiate
comprehending films from interpreting them symptomatically is probably
relatively unproblematic. However, drawing a dividing line between an act
of comprehension and an explicative interpretation – one attentive to
“implicit” as well as “explicit” meanings – seems much more difficult.
Moreover, the division appears to guarantee that “comprehending” a film,
for Bordwell, could not involve grasping any ironic meanings it might
express.
Several figures (e.g.: Branigan [1993], Perkins [1990], Wilson [1997;
2008]) – have questioned Bordwell’s claim that comprehension can be
pried apart from explicative interpretation. Perhaps the most suggestive
starting point is the approach V. F. Perkins takes to “explicit meaning”.
Perkins argues that to regard “comprehending” films as involving
“extracting from the movie statements which […] resemble messages
such as ‘There’s no place like home’” (1990, p. 5) appears to demand
“an imperviousness to the complexity of cinematic expression” (Perkins,
1990, p. 2). This, Perkins argues, is because,
Statements always come in a context which guides the assessment we can
make of them. When they occur in a movie, what we make of them (how
literally, so to speak, we take them) depends on the way we understand
them to function in a context that has been elaborately constructed.
(1990, p. 3)
The scope of the “context” that a fiction film may use to affect the
meaning of any spoken statement consists, we might say, of every single
thing that films contain besides isolatable lines of dialogue – guaranteeing
it will be “elaborately constructed”, indeed. The significance of this for
thinking about irony readily suggests itself. Mentioning “irony” only
sparingly, Perkins’s article nonetheless fixes repeatedly on cinematic
moments (from Psycho [1960], Caught [1949], and The Wizard of Oz
[1939] itself) which use numerous means available to filmmakers –
performance, staging, music, framing – to ensure that statements or
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actions which could have been affirmed are instead “substantially
qualified by the film’s other data” (1990, p. 3). By doing so, he
effectively demonstrates that even “comprehending” films requires
remaining alert to the various ways in which “explicit” and “implicit”
meanings interrelate – which is surely another way of saying that we must
interpret them. Furthermore, it seems likely that we will only register how
a film demands to be interpreted if we are attentive to precisely that which
Bordwell claims to be interested in: “the surface of the work” (1989,
p. 264).
I suggest that our frequent need to account for the numerous ironies
that a film’s “surface” can imply demonstrates especially plainly how
difficult it is to separate the “implicit” from the “explicit” in this medium,
or indeed “interpreting” films from “comprehending” them. Seeking an
example to help illustrate this, it will be instructive to look far afield from
the only traditions Bordwell is willing to admit “may well require
interpretive leaps for their full enjoyment or satisfaction” – experimental
or “art” films (1993, p. 96). In this spirit: the beloved 90s Hollywood teen
comedy Clueless (Amy Heckerling, 1995) frequently stresses the
perceptual chasm suggested by its title, and employs several kinds of
irony to this effect. Looking at just the first few minutes of the “surface”
of this most mainstream of movies suggests how crucial interpretation
routinely is to our “comprehension” of films.
Mis-Match! Comprehending (and Interpreting)
Ironic Meanings in Clueless
Following two vibrantly-coloured animated credit screens, Clueless begins
in an almost aggressively exuberant manner when it thrusts us into a
30-second montage depicting a clique of ostentatiously affluent teenagers
enjoying an apparently unremittingly fun existence in and around various
sun-drenched, upscale Beverly Hills locales. Accompanied by a bubbly
pop-punk cover of Kim Wilde’s “Kids in America” (“Friday night and
everyone’s moving, / I can feel the heat but it’s soothing”), the film
immediately begins intercutting rapidly between shots of these brightly
and fashionably dressed young men and women giggling and grinning
while driving around LA in a jeep; striding cheerfully out of stores with
shopping bags in their hands; falling about laughing in a diner (one girl
feeds a boy a cherry doused in cream); and frolicking by an elaborate
outdoor pool replete with waterfalls and faux-Roman statues.
Complementing the energetic editing and music, the camera captures
the ebullient antics of this gaggle of kids in whip-pans, handheld shots,
juddery slow-motion, and a host of crash-zooms into and away from
beaming faces. Over two final images of the gang by the pool, we now hear
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one of its female members, Cher (Alicia Silverstone), addressing us in
voiceover: “So, okay: you’re probably going, ‘ Is this, like, a Noxzema
commercial or what? ’”
With this we cut to a close-up of Cher smiling while flipping back her
long blonde hair, our view soon expanding to reveal her standing alone in
front of a large gold-framed bedroom mirror. “But seriously,” her
narration continues over this image, “I actually have a way normal life
for a teenage girl: I mean – I get up, I brush my teeth, and I pick out
my school clothes.” While listening to these final words – now
accompanied on the soundtrack by David Bowie’s song “Fashion”
(“Turn to the left! / Turn to the right!”) – we see Cher happily skipping
towards the doors of a huge walk-in wardrobe. An edit, however,
then presents us with a close-up of a desktop monitor displaying a
sort of virtual-closet: a computer programme that is allowing Cher to
scroll through component parts of various designer outfits. A dialogue
box declaring “MIS-MATCH!” now pops up on the screen with an
unpleasant buzz in response to an unbecoming skirt/jacket combination.
A frowning Cher nonetheless perseveres, previewing how the next
ensemble looks on an onscreen avatar of her, and this time
nodding with satisfaction at her choice as the camera pushes in on her
smiling face.
Within ninety seconds, Heckerling’s opening establishes at least three
different kinds of irony – dramatic, structural, and communicative
(or “verbal”) – that will characterise much of the film’s overall comic
address, and whose implications I consider essential to comprehending
the film’s most elementary “meanings”. We might begin with perhaps the
commonest of these forms: dramatic irony, which requires engineering
and stressing a “discrepant awareness” (Evans 1960) between our
perspective and that of characters.
The “mis-matched” relationship between voiceover, dramatic action
and editing here begins the film’s strategy of contriving conspicuous
contrasts between Cher’s words and their context. Especially as scored by
the burst of Bowie’s mechanical-sounding song about fashionistas, the
implication of the cut to the virtual wardrobe is clear: notwithstanding her
protestations, Cher’s teenage life is far from “way normal”. This dramatic
irony is also indebted to Silverstone’s performance – her repetitive
intonation on “I get up, I brush my teeth, and I pick out my school
clothes” emphasising the depth of Cher’s belief that she is reciting a
list of dully predictable chores. Furthermore, the way she is shown
perkily prancing towards the physical closet might suggest we are about
to experience the familiar sight of a 90s comic Hollywood heroine
playfully perusing a rack of outfits (perhaps in a pop-driven montage).
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Such expectations having been conjured, the revelation of the computer
screen establishes we are instead dealing with a character who regards
selecting clothes in this peculiarly impersonal manner to be equally
commonplace as the more routine activities we were encouraged to
anticipate. Thus, the more blithely Silverstone embodies Cher’s
relationship to this state of affairs, the greater our ironic distance from
her character’s perspective.
This moment makes tangible, firstly, that “referential meanings” in film
will tend to be at least partially “implicit”. Bordwell readily acknowledges
that even grasping “referential” meaning typically involves “inferential
activities” (1993, p. 103); nonetheless, he also believes that the distinction
between comprehension and interpretation represents a difference
between “following the story and ascribing an abstract, implicit […]
meaning to that story” (Bordwell, 1989, p. 96). Yet, not only will
“following the story” involve inferences, but those inferences will often
fundamentally depend upon our ability to weigh what a film expresses
“explicitly” against what it expresses “implicitly”.
Why is it that, despite Cher telling us that the way she picks out her
school clothes is “normal”, this cannot be said to constitute a “referential
meaning” of Clueless? In order to regard the incongruity between Cher’s
description and her routine as (intentionally) incongruous, we must
realise that what is being presented “explicitly” – say, what we are told or
see of this fictional world – gains its significance only in relation to
meanings implied by how that world is presented. We must assume, for
instance, that for the film to reveal Cher using this virtual-wardrobe while
she is proclaiming her normalcy is not a mistake, but rather a pointed
stylistic gesture whose rhetorical purpose we are being required to
surmise. In short: the “referential meaning” of this moment is surely not
“Cher lives a normal life”, but something closer to: “Cher mistakenly
believes her extraordinarily privileged life to be ordinary”. To infer the
latter meaning, however, we must register the precise clash engineered
between the film’s “explicit” and “implicit” modes of address. We
therefore cannot comprehend this moment – even in the sense of
“following the story” – without interpreting it.
Meanwhile, the adjective upon which much of this moment’s dramatic
irony depends – “normal” – suggests something else significant. Bordwell
repeatedly claims that only if we are engaged in the occult critical activity
of interpreting will we be concerned with “the interpretation of a culture’s
symbolic values” (1989, p. 16), or interested in, say, “mak[ing] the
protagonists bear abstract semantic values” (1989, p. 157). Yet: is it
possible to comprehend most films’ stories without inferring the
“symbolic values” that films themselves frequently make their
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characters bear – not least protagonists? I suggest not, which points
towards another kind of irony this sequence inaugurates.
Cher is not only Clueless’ protagonist, but also enjoys an especially
privileged position within the film’s narrative structures. She possesses the
authority conferred by a voiceover, and also knows she is addressing an
audience – indeed apparently a cinema audience, since she refers to what
we see in audiovisual terms (“is this, like, a Noxzema commercial or
what?”). Thus, even if we are not invited to assume that Cher is quite
producing the filmic image,6 she is at least aware of how we perceive her
fictional world, and definitely our primary guide through it. A character
granted such a superior vantage point seems intuitively to have the
potential for superior insight. Importantly, Cher’s first line actually
promises this. Speaking as if to a somewhat sceptical viewer, she
ingratiates herself by aiming some scepticism of her own towards the
stridently upbeat initial montage – which, if we share her cultural
reference points, may indeed have brought to mind something like a
mid-90s zit cream advertisement. This momentarily implies that Cher’s
values may be not so different to those of the film, nor those of its
assumed audience – since, why would a film mockingly comment on its
jaunty depiction of cavorting rich-kids, if it did not anticipate a viewer
who might themselves subject such a thing to mockery? Her “But
seriously”, though, begins a rather different relationship between the
film’s implied values and her own, which will be maintained for much
of the movie. That relationship is one characterised by a sustained
structural irony.
M. H. Abrams defines structural irony in literature as involving an
author “introduc[ing] a structural feature that serves to sustain a duplex
meaning and evaluation throughout the work” (1999, p. 135). As soon
becomes clear, the decision to have Cher serve as our guide to Clueless’
world is a prime instance of a particular technique that lends itself well to
this kind of irony, namely: “the invention of a naı¨ve […] narrator or
spokes[person], whose invincible simplicity or obtuseness leads him [sic]
to persist in putting an interpretation on affairs which the knowing reader
[…] just as persistently is called on to alter” (Abrams, 1999, p. 135).
We must thus continuously “alter” such a figure’s interpretations if we are
6. I tend to agree with theorists (e.g.: Kozloff, 1989) who are sceptical of the concept of
“first-person” cinematic narrators per se – that is: the notion that characters speaking in
voiceover should ordinarily also be imagined as somehow responsible for creating every
aspect their film’s narration (as we usually assume in the case of “first-person”
narrators of prose fictions).
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not to misunderstand the states of affairs – or, in Bordwell’s terms,
“referential meanings” – they describe. We sense how we are being
invited to “alter” their interpretations, meanwhile, by inferring how this
figure’s various evaluations and interpretations differ from those
motivating the work, and which the work also assumes will likely
motivate our interpretations. To avoid misconstruing the “referential
meaning” of Clueless ’ “virtual-closet” revelation, then, we must infer (1)
the sorts of values implied by Cher’s description; (2) that the film believes
itself to be addressing an audience who would be unlikely to evaluate
computerised touch-screen wardrobes as “normal”; and finally, (3) that
the values endorsed by the film are closer to those imputed to us than to
the kind of moneyed entitlement Cher’s description suggests. We will be
repeatedly required to make such inferences about Clueless’ broader
evaluative frameworks throughout the film in order to comprehend the
kind of “duplex meaning and evaluation” (Abrams, 1999, p. 135) that
results from having such a protagonist as our chaperone.
Note that the implied “meanings” we must infer in order to grasp these
ironies are neither quite “referential”, nor a “conceptual meaning or
‘point ’” (Bordwell, 1989, p. 8). Rather, they come closer to what Perkins
calls “balances of judgment on the facts and behaviour portrayed” (1990,
p. 5). In this sense, then, dramatic and structural irony will often be
indebted to a film’s point of view – taking this to include not only a film’s
handling of, say, our spatio-temporal access to the fictional world, but also
its overall “attitude or orientation towards the characters” (Thomas, 2000,
p. 20; see also Pye, 2000). Significantly, two of the sharpest critiques of
Making Meaning have come from two of the foremost theorists of filmic
point of view: Edward Branigan and George Wilson. In his response,
Branigan actually passingly mentions dramatic irony by name (1993,
p. 11) to help explain why “interpretation might penetrate comprehension
at rather fundamental levels” (Branigan, 1993, p. 10). Wilson too refers
to point of view alongside several other aspects of movies that
regularly require interpretation, yet which remain unaccounted for by
Bordwell:
It is widely assumed that interpretation always purports to specify a meaning
or a constellation of meanings for a work of art. […] [H]owever,
interpretative work on film is frequently focused on understanding,
e.g., aspects of style, tone, and point of view, and the detailed analysis of
these matters need not issue in something that one would naturally refer to
as “meaning.” (2008, p. 163)
What we infer from such aspects of films is indeed perhaps not
characteristically best described as “meaning”. However, as Clueless’
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dramatic and structural ironies suggest, we must nonetheless often
interpret what is meaningful about, say, a film’s point of view in order
even to comprehend its story. Another phenomenon mentioned by
Wilson, tone, can be equally crucial, and relates to the final aspect of irony
I want to consider here.
“Ironic tone” is among the most commonly discussed concepts in
scholarship on ironic communication (for an overview, see Bryant and
Fox Tree, 2005). In film studies, by contrast, tone is so seldom addressed
that it has been dubbed by one of its very few theorists “a missing
concept” (Pye, 2007, p. 5). We need this concept, though, to explain the
sort of irony at play in Clueless’ very first moments: the bouncy montage of
Cher’s friends frolicking around Beverly Hills. This kind of irony is
directed less towards particular figures’ perspectives, and more towards a
film’s own manner of expression. This is a type of ironic expression that in
linguistic situations – say, a sarcastic comment – would be called verbal
irony, but which we can more usefully refer to by a less medium-specific
name: communicative irony (Currie, 2011; MacDowell, 2016, pp. 59–81).
Varying theoretical explanations of communicative irony exist (see
Sperber & Wilson, 2007), but perhaps the simplest maintains that it
involves “pretending to have a certain outlook, perspective, or point of
view” (Currie, 2010, p. 157) in order to “highlight the defects of that
point of view” (Currie, 2010, p. 165). If a friend announces “lovely day!”
during a torrential downpour, we can usually assume they are pretending
that – speaking as if – they hold either a mistaken or deeply eccentric
assessment of the weather. Communicative irony therefore involves
striking an ironic attitude towards precisely the viewpoint one pretends
to express. For artworks to create this kind of irony, then, they
must ironise an outlook communicated through the very means of
expression they are employing. In prose fictions, communicative irony
might be “expressive of [an] attitude towards the narration itself”
(Currie, 2010, p. 171) – for instance, a novel’s narrator could momentarily
use admiring language to (pretend to) praise the intelligence of an
imbecilic character. In a medium like painting, meanwhile, it often
manifests in “parodies of the cliche´s, mannerisms, styles, conventions,
ideologies and theories of [other] artists, schools or periods” (Muecke,
1970, pp. 2–3).
This potential link between communicative irony and parody may help
clarify its connection with tone. Douglas Pye, who has written the only
extended study on filmic tone, notes that movies can “take up varying
relationships to […] conventions and norms, including parody” (2000,
p. 12). One function of a film’s tone, suggests Pye, is to signal the nature
of this relationship between a film and its conventions – how it “implicitly
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invites us to understand its attitude to […] the stylistic register it
employs” (2007, p. 7). Clueless’ opening montage offers a good example of
a film’s implied attitude towards its own stylistic register being pointedly
ironic. If a film combines images of over-privileged young people in
glamorous settings with 90s teen-film conventions like a peppy song about
the joys of youth, or a flamboyantly vibrant visual style, this could
potentially suggest a wholly enthusiastic endorsement of the events
depicted and the values they imply. However, as Pye argues, sensing a film
adopting a degree of “formal or stylistic distance” (2000, p. 12) towards
its conventions,
has something in common with registering in conversation that someone is
employing conventional phrases with a certain ironic distance. Perhaps
knowing the speaker and/or responding to the context, we understand that
their use of a phrase carries implied “quotation marks”. Sometimes of
course we hear the quotation marks in their voice, but at other times,
although there is no change in vocal manner, we intuit that the phrase is not
being used “straight”. (2007, p. 44)
When watching films we often similarly intuit the degree of “distance”
with which conventions are employed by “mak[ing] a judgement about
the film’s relationship to its methods, based on our assessment of how
particular decisions function in their context” (Pye, 2007, p. 44). Once
Clueless’ opening montage has been contextualised by Cher’s quip about a
skin-cream commercial, and even more after what we learn about her own
out-of-touch perspective, it becomes difficult to avoid concluding that the
tone with which the sequence has been offered is, at least in part, ironic.
The film pretends to use these conventional materials “straight”, before
revealing that it was in fact deploying them with heavy “quotation
marks” – indeed, almost parodying them. Interpreting this moment in
context thus obliges us to infer that Clueless is using communicative irony:
mocking-via-imitation a lifestyle, audiovisual style, and a set of associated
cultural values, from which the film desires to imply a significant degree of
ironic distance.
The elements of Clueless whose “meanings” we must infer in order to
grasp the film’s employment of dramatic, structural, and communicative
irony are things such as: the film’s approach to voiceover, camera style,
editing, music, Silverstone’s performance, and so on. Such phenomena
might reasonably be said to represent “the surface of the work” (Bordwell,
1989, p. 264). This, of course, is precisely what Bordwell urges us to focus
on. Yet it is a curious fact about Making Meaning that it culminates by
arguing film scholarship should be dedicated to analysing “the
compositional processes of form and style” (Bordwell, 1989, p. 271),
Interpretation, Irony and “Surface Meanings” in Film
273
when it has previously defined “comprehending” films as something
achievable by reading a line of their screenplay – for instance: “There’s no
place like home.” Returning to Bordwell’s argument in light of the
foregoing discussions of irony should help explain why this surely can
never be the case, and may finally allow us to take stock of the prospect of
defining “surface meanings” for film.
“Surface Meaning” in Films
Bordwell claims that “what may matter as much as implicit or
symptomatic meanings is the surface of the work” (1989, p. 264); yet it
is precisely his unwillingness to account for the “surface” that
prompts Perkins to accuse him of exhibiting “an imperviousness to the
complexity of cinematic expression” (1990, p. 2). If that accusation
seems in this case justifiable, then it is because the Bordwell of Making
Meaning refuses to engage with a key question: what might be particular
about the relationship between “surfaces” and “meanings” in a medium
like film?
In keeping with his constructivist credo that “meaning is made, not
found” (1989, p. 103), Bordwell ostensibly believes meanings can only
ever be “postulated”, never discovered, since meanings exist only in
audiences’ minds, not artworks. Yet he nonetheless also desires to claim
that comprehension “postulates something concretely there – say, the
characters represented, the action of the story, and the dramatic point or
significance of it all” (1993, p. 95) – whereas interpretation assumes that
“what the film says is not ‘ literally ’ on the surface but is instead meaning
of an implicit or symptomatic kind” (1989, pp. 31–2). These scare-quotes
should prompt us to ask: what meanings that can be attributed to live-
action fiction films are ever “ ‘ literally ’ on the surface”? Literal meanings
can certainly be assigned to what is “concretely there” in poems or prose
fictions, whose “surfaces” comprise words and sentences. They can
likewise be attributed to individual lines on the pages of a script. But a
literal meaning is not something easily expressed by a textual “surface”
that consists not of words, but rather assemblages of edited and
soundtracked footage, usually depicting specific actors speaking lines in
precise ways, framed in particular configurations, amongst and in relation
to concretely realised environments, in certain narrative contexts.
Although Bordwell’s quotation marks suggest his cognizance of this, he
nevertheless effectively glosses over the fact with his attempt to define a
film’s “literal meaning” as a combination of “the referential meaning of
the film and any explicit point or message” (1989, p.64).
As Clueless’ ironies suggest, however, even the “referential” meanings of
a story will often need to be inferred from what we take a film to be
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implying through its form, style, and so on. And this is surely only bound
to be truer still of a film’s “conceptual meaning or ‘point ’” (1989, p. 8).
Assuming we should even attribute such things to films,7 this type of
“meaning” seems by definition to constitute an abstract “message” or
“statement”. As such, how could we believe a movie might be capable of
expressing such a “conceptual meaning” literally without also holding the
questionable belief “that the ‘ literal meaning’ of a film is the literal
meaning of any statement spoken in it” (Perkins, 1990, p. 3)? This belief
would clearly be inadvisable in the case of Clueless. Yet Heckerling’s film
and its ironies can serve as a more general warning against ever confusing
the meaning of a line as written with the meanings expressed by a film as
made. From Clueless to “art cinema” to The Wizard of Oz, comprehending
live-action narrative films will not only require us to understand words
with literal meanings, but will also require us to interpret how these words
interact with the whole multitude of unavoidably implicit ways in which a
work of plotted, dramatised, designed, acted, shot, cut, and scored fiction
will necessarily be expressing itself.
Looking at irony thus helps remind us of something simple but
fundamental about filmic expression: that much of what we are doing
when “comprehending” films is interpreting how their “explicit” and
“implicit” modes of address have been designed to interrelate. One lesson
of this would seem to be that, if we want to grasp even “referential”
meanings, we have little choice but to interpret, since all that a film’s
“surface” can do is imply. Another apparent consequence of this, then,
would seem to be that films can never reasonably be described as
expressing “literal” meanings at all. This possibility, though, raises a
potentially tricky question, at least as regards filmic irony: if this medium’s
expressive properties ensure that no meanings can be called “literal”, all
are implied, where does this leave the possibility of distinguishing
something like a “surface-literal meaning” (Giora, 1997, p. 239) from
something like a “non-literal” meaning (Booth, 1974, p. 40), which seems
so crucial to irony?
We might begin to answer this by turning, firstly, to strands within
research into ironic expression itself. During a recent overview of
numerous competing linguistic approaches to communicative irony,
Marta Dynel observes that one thing almost all scholars agree upon is
that “the literal import of an ironic utterance differs from the implicit
7. As George Wilson has noted on more than one occasion (1997; 2008), to attribute an
“explicit meaning” of this kind to a film would effectively be to commit the age-old
critical “heresy of paraphrase”.
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meaning the speaker intends to communicate” (2014, p. 540). However,
she goes on to note that,
Besides tacitly agreeing on the literal vs. implied meaning distinction, most
authors are unanimous that irony inherently expresses the speaker’s attitude,
and thus serves as a vehicle for an evaluative judgment/evaluation of an
utterance, action, event, situation, etc. (Dynel, 2014, p. 540)
Even in the realm of verbal statements, then, it appears that what may be
just as important to irony as literal or implied “meanings” is what another
linguist calls “perspective clashing” (Mayerhofer, 2013): the act of
meaningfully juxtaposing one perspective against another, one attitude
against another. A key general benefit of such terminology is that it seems
appropriate not just to communicative/verbal irony, but also to dramatic
and structural ironies, which ironise the perspectives and values of
characters. Moreover, this account is also clearly much more conducive to
explaining the ironic capacities of film specifically, whose expressive
properties may prevent them from offering “literal meanings”, but
which – as we have seen – are certainly able to imply divergent
perspectives and attitudes.
But one final wrinkle might still remain. It certainly seems promising for
film’s ironic capacities if ironic expression can do without the “literal”
component of “surface-literal meaning” (Giora, 1997, p. 239). In order to
explain ironic expression in film, then, perhaps we need not speak of
“meanings” at all, but only of the various perspectives or attitudes that a
film can imply. However, can irony really exist without any concept of
“surface meaning” at all? It is surely the case that ironic expression still
necessarily involves establishing discrepancies between something that
seems to be apparent and something else that is implied – even if neither
of these somethings need be a “meaning”, narrowly defined. If films can
only express themselves by implication, how can this medium ever hope
to enact this crucial distinction: juxtaposing a “surface” meaning,
perspective or attitude against an “implied” meaning, perspective or
attitude?
The answer may simply be that movies are evidently capable of granting
different perspectives and attitudes different weights and emphases –
offering some “straight” and ironising others; this is what Perkins refers
to, appropriately elusively, as “the resources that can be discovered in film
to shade information, grade effects” (1990, p. 5). Yet, since those
resources must encompass film’s entire panoply of non-linguistic
expressive devices, the first problem is that defining precisely which
element of a film is lending greater importance to which perspective will
always require hard interpretive work – even if equipped with vocabulary
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more sensitive to the medium than “literal” or “non-literal” meanings. An
additional issue is that, even in cases of literary irony, it can “often [be]
hard to say what is the overt and what the covert meaning” (Booth, 1974,
p. 156). This interpretive predicament is considerably heightened when
the nature of film’s “surface” seemingly ensures that all the relevant
perspectives and attitudes can never be more than implied: how are we to
articulate why we take one to be more or less “implicit” than another?
Finally, there is the fact that the precise weights and emphases granted
different attitudes and perspectives can and regularly do shift subtly and
frequently across the span of any film.
To illustrate briefly what some of these problems look like in practice,
consider another moment from Clueless, this time from towards its
conclusion. Cher is again travelling the streets of Beverly Hills, but now
she wanders dejectedly alone, lost in thought, accompanied by the
powerfully self-pitying strains of (Jewel’s rendition of) “All by Myself”.
She has been recounting in voiceover her dawning awareness that she is
“totally clueless” on many matters of life and love, culminating ultimately
in admitting to herself something the film has invited us to suspect for
some time: that she is in love with Josh (Paul Rudd), her step-brother.
This epiphany comes as Cher is walking by a grand outdoor fountain,
which is kept in full view as Cher pauses in front of it, designer shopping
bag in hand. Three things happen simultaneously at the instant her
realisation arrives: (1) Cher raises her eyes heavenward and announces –
aloud to herself, with furrowed brow – “Oh my god…”; (2) the cascading
jets of the resplendent fountain behind her suddenly become illuminated
from below by brilliant pink and white lights; and (3) a brass fanfare rises
onto the soundtrack with a triumphant flourish; Cher then turns slightly
to face the camera as it moves in closer, her features resolving into a
wonderstruck smile: “ I love Josh!”
An interpretation wishing to do nominal justice to the different
emphases being granted the various attitudes and perspectives implied by
this moment must account for a great deal. We might first fall back on our
various types of irony. There is assuredly again communicative irony at
play in the film’s tone here. Even if we do not register a lightly parodic nod
being made to a similar fountain-adjacent moment of romantic realisation
from the musical Gigi (Vincente Minnelli, 1958), the sheer rhetorical
excess of combining this sudden lighting change with this exultant fanfare
must signal that at least a partly ironic attitude is being struck towards
these conventions. Equally, to ironise these aspects of the film’s style is
also apparently to ironise the state of mind they putatively express –
Cher’s realisation – suggesting a measure of dramatic irony at her expense.
Dramatic and communicative irony thus seem to become fused: the film
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pretends wholly to share in Cher’s moment of romantic recognition, yet
lends it such over-emphasis that we are discouraged from taking either the
stylistic register or her realisation entirely “straight”.
At the same time, however, interpreting these ironic strategies in context
obliges us to recognise that they are also being to some extent qualified.
In contrast to the dramatic irony of the computerised wardrobe scene,
the literal meaning of Cher’s words is no longer being straightforwardly
contradicted by what we see. Equally, the film cannot be implying that
Cher’s newfound viewpoint here is quite mistaken: she often has indeed
been “clueless”, and does love Josh. In fact, partly because she is now
prepared to pass judgement on herself using that titular term (which she
has hitherto only levelled judgmentally at others), we surely are being
invited to regard her realisation with some genuine celebration. As such,
the ironic attitude implied towards the celebratory fanfare and fountain
also cannot be of quite the kind that was directed towards the superficially
congratulatory opening montage of her friends’ affluent jaunt through L. A.
Indeed, if that sequence inaugurated the structural irony that has
characterised much of our relationship with Cher, this moment seems in
fact to signal its end – or at least diminishment. We might say that her own
perspective has finally begun to catch up with something much closer to the
point of view that Heckerling’s film has frequently adopted towards her,
and that the film’s tone invites us to appreciate the momentousness and
joy of this occasion, even while poking gentle fun at its belatedness. The
concluding, fanfare-scored track-in towards Cher’s thunderstruck smile
here thus implies something different than the push-in on her satisfiedly
nodding to the strains of Bowie, which concluded her virtual-outfit
selection. Rather than paradoxically emphasising the distance at which
the film presently regards her, this increased closeness now expresses a
still-qualified, but nonetheless genuine, escalation of the sympathy that
has to varying degrees always bubbled beneath the film’s ironic attitude
towards its frequently “clueless”, but often impressive and perennially
charming, protagonist.
Compared with the apparently solid ground offered by reassuring
metaphors like “literal meaning”, or even “surface meaning”, the
requirement of continuously weighing implied perspectives and attitudes,
points of view and tones, could appear both extremely arduous and
hopelessly woolly. Likewise, a formulation such as “the resources that can
be discovered in film to shade information, grade effects” (Perkins, 1990,
p. 5) may seem to offer the interpretive critic precious little of comfort to
cling to in defining the medium’s expressive properties. One possible
response is to attempt to withdraw from the field of interpretation entirely
by calling for attention only to the “surface of the work” (Bordwell, 1989,
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p. 264). Yet if this kind of attention must fail to account for even so
commonplace a form of storytelling as, say, dramatic irony, it becomes
not only incapable of interpreting fiction films, but unable to
comprehend them in the most elementary of senses. Film’s “surfaces”
remain indispensable to both comprehension and interpretation, but not
because they contain overt and incontestable “literal” meanings, nor
because they are necessarily more “sensuous” than they are meaningful.
It is rather because only here will the interpreting viewer encounter the
only resources this resolutely non-literal medium truly has for “making
meaning”: shading information, grading effects, presenting this embodied
perspective with that suggested attitude – in other words: “its
possibilities for ‘making overt ’, which in large degree means its
capacity to imply” (Perkins, 1990, p. 4).
The fact that film studies can still sometimes appear somewhat clueless
about how to conceive of these resources with requisite sensitivity
to the medium of filmed fiction is undoubtedly due to a disciplinary
tendency Bordwell’s Making Meaning both diagnoses and perpetuates.
As Wilson puts it: like many others, Bordwell still seems to be “looking
to ‘meanings ’ in linguistic contexts as models for the kinds of
meanings that […] interpretation purports to explain” (1997, p. 226).
However, if wrestling with irony can force even the field of linguistics
to decentre the concept of “meaning”, without losing sight of other
means of becoming meaningful, perhaps it can prompt film interpreters
to do the same.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrams, M. H. (1999). A Glossary of Literary Terms. New York: Holt.
Allen, R. (2007). Hitchcock’s Romantic Irony. New York: Columbia UP.
Auger, P. (2010). The Anthem Dictionary of Literary Terms. London: Anthem Press.
Best, S, and Marcus, S. (2009). “Surface Reading: An Introduction. ” Representations 108: 1,
1–21.
Booth, Wayne C. (1974). A Rhetoric of Irony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bordwell, D. (1989). Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema.
London: Harvard UP.
Bordwell, D. (1993). “Film Interpretation Revisited”, Film Criticism, 17: 2/3, 93–129.
Branigan, E. (1993). “On the Analysis of Interpretive Language, Part I ”, Film Criticism, 17:
2/3 (1993), 4–21.
Bribitzer-Stull, M. (2004). “ ‘Did You Hear Love’s Fond Farewell? ’ Some Examples of
Thematic Irony in Wagner’s Ring”, Journal of Musicological Research, 23:2, 123–157.
Bryant, G A. & Fox Tree, J. E.. (2005). “ Is There an Ironic Tone of Voice?”, Language and
Speech 48: 3 257–277.
Colebrook, C. (2004). Irony. New York: Routledge.
Currie, G. (2010). Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Currie, G. (2011). “The Irony in Pictures”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 51: 2, 149–167.
Dempster, G. C. (1932). Dramatic Irony in Chaucer. Stanford: Stanford UP.
Interpretation, Irony and “Surface Meanings” in Film
279
Doane, MM. A. (1979). “The Dialogic Text: Filmic Irony and the Spectator”. PhD Thesis,
University of Iowa.
Eco, U. (1992). “Overinterpreting Texts”, in Collini, Stefan (ed), Interpretation and
Overinterpretation (pp. 45–66). Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Ellestro¨m, L. (2002). Divine Madness: On Interpreting Literature, Music, and the Visual Arts
Ironically. London: Bucknell UP.
Evans, B. (1960). Shakespeare’s Comedies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fish, S. (1989). Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in
Literary and Legal Studies. Durham: Duke UP.
Giora, R. (1997). “Understanding Figurative and Literal Language: The Graded Salience
Hypothesis ”. Cognitive Linguistics, 8: 3, 183–206.
Hutcheon, L. (1994). Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony. New York: Routledge.
Jameson, F. (1983). The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. London:
Routledge.
Kozloff, S. (1989). Invisible Storytellers: Voice-over Narration in American Fiction Film. Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Kroeber, K. (2006). Make Believe in Film and Fiction: Visual vs. Verbal Storytelling. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
MacDowell, J. (2016). Irony in Film. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Marks, L.U. (2002). Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Martin, Adrian & A´lvarez Lo´pez, C. (2013). “The Moves: Precise Sequences of Emotion”,
Transit: Cine y Otros Desvı´os, online: http://cinentransit.com/las-jugadas-intro/.
Mayerhofer, B. (2013). “Perspective Clashing as a Humour Mechanism”, in Dynel, Marta
(ed.) Developments in Linguistic Humour Theory (pp. 211–234). Amsterdam: John
Benjamins Publishing.
Muecke, D. C. (1969). The Compass of Irony. London: Methuen.
Muecke, D. C. (1970). Irony and the Ironic. London: Methuen.
Perkins, V. F. (1990). “Must we Say What They Mean? Film Criticism and Interpretation”,
Movie 34, 1–6.
Pye, D. (2000). “Movies and Point of View”, Movie 36, 2–34.
Pye, D. (2007). “Movies and Tone”, in Gibbs, John & Douglas Pye (eds), Close-Up 02
(pp. 1–80). London: Wallflower Press.
Sconce, J. (2002). “ Irony, Nihilism and the New American ‘Smart ’ Film”, Screen 43: 4,
349–69.
Sontag, S. (1966). Against Interpretation and Other Essays. London: Macmillan.
Sperber, Dan & Wilson, D. (2007). “On Verbal Irony”, in Gibbs, Raymond W. & Herbert L.
Colston (eds), Irony in Language and Thought: A Cognitive Science Reader (pp. 35–55).
New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Stringfellow, F. (1994). The Meaning of Irony: A Psychoanalytic Investigation. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Thomas, D. (2000). Beyond Genre: Melodrama, Comedy and Romance in Hollywood Films.
Moffat: Cameron & Hollis.
Wilson, G M. (1992). “Again, Theory: On Speaker’s Meaning, Linguistic Meaning, and the
Meaning of a Text”, Critical Inquiry, 19: 1, 164–185.
Wilson, G. M. (1997). “On Film Narrative and Narrative Meaning” in Richard Allen and
Murray Smith (eds.) Film Theory and Philosophy (pp. 221–38). Oxford: Oxford UP.
Wilson, George M. (2008). “ Interpretation”, in Livingston, Paisley and Carl Plantinga
(eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film (pp. 162–71). New York:
Routledge.
Film-Philosophy 22 (2018)
280
